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Cosmopolitanism and the culture of
peacebuilding
CATHERINE GOETZE and BERIT BLIESEMANN de GUEVARA*
Abstract. Cosmopolitanism has been argued to be a crucial component of peacebuilding, both
with regard to its aims as well as its staff. In a universalist-liberal understanding of the concept,
cosmopolitanism is the optimal mind frame for peacebuilders to rebuild post-war societies, due
to the tolerance, justice-orientation, and neutrality regarding local cleavages that the concept
entails in theory. This article argues, however, that cosmopolitanism cannot be understood
outside of its social context, therefore requiring sociological empirical analyses. Drawing on
three such sociological concepts, namely elite, glocal, and localisable cosmopolitanism, the
article analyses empirically through interviews with peacebuilders in Kosovo whether and in
which form these international civil servants display cosmopolitan worldviews. The study con-
cludes that while in theory the localisable variant would be best suited to contribute to locally
sensitive, emancipatory peacebuilding, this form of cosmopolitanism is absent in practice.
Given the novel, exploratory character of this analysis of hitherto uncharted terrain, the article
also discusses in detail how the ﬁndings were obtained and in how far they are generalisable.
Dr Catherine Goetze is Associate Professor for International Politics and Head of the School
of International Studies at the University of Nottingham Ningbo China. She has worked on
post-conﬂict reconstruction particularly of civil society organisations and on critical conﬂict
analysis. Her most recent publications include a Special Issue of the journal Global Society on
‘Cosmopolitanism and global citizenship’. She is currently working on a project using Pierre
Bourdieu’s sociological concepts to analyse peacebuilding as a social and professional ﬁeld of
world politics.
Dr Berit Bliesemann de Guevara is Senior Lecturer in Peacebuilding, Post-War Reconstruction,
and Transitional Justice at the Department of International Politics at Aberystwyth University.
Her current research focuses on issues of knowledge production and functions of narrations in
international conﬂict management and peacebuilding, especially the role of the International
Crisis Group, the functions of urban legends of intervention, and the discursive and performative
aspects of politicians’ troop visits. Previous research has included the international politics
of peace- and statebuilding, the local dynamics of state-formation under internationalised
conditions, causes and courses of intra-state armed conﬂicts, and charisma and politics. Berit
is editor of the Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding.
Introduction
Cosmopolitanism has been frequently put forward as the political ideology that
should underpin peacebuilding missions. There are a number of reasons for this claim,
of which the most important is the connection that is made between the tolerance
and universalism of cosmopolitanism on the one hand, and the idea of peace as
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reconciliation and justice in war-torn societies on the other.1 In order to build cosmo-
politan societies, civilian peacebuilders, too, should be cosmopolitans, so the idea,
both aspects being part of the general project of constructing global governance on
the ideas of democracy, human rights, and justice.
As for other professionals in the aid, volunteering, and expat industries, civilian
peacebuilders are expected to be open-minded, tolerant, ﬂexible, polyglot with a
living experience in several countries and to adjust easily to strange environments.2
Furthermore, they should, professionalism oblige, subscribe to the goals and values
of the United Nations, particularly human rights and the idea of achieving peace
through justice. These are not only professional requirements with the rationale to
make individuals adapt well into difﬁcult environments. They also underlie the argu-
ment that peacebuilding has to create cosmopolitan societies: only cosmopolitans
have the tolerance, open-mindedness, and justice-orientation to rebuild societies after
conﬂict.3
Although cosmopolitanism is thus a crucial requirement for civilian peacebuild-
ing staff, it has, up to now, not constituted a research area in its own right, maybe
because this requirement appears so common-sensical and straightforward. This
article, by contrast, is based on the assumption that more detailed studies of peace-
builders’ dispositions are crucial for our understanding of peacebuilding, because
mind frames, attitudes, ideas, and worldviews matter, even if the ofﬁcial discourse
of the United Nations and other international organisations declares that civilian
staff in interim administrations are ‘merely’ civil servants. As Se´ve´rine Autesserre
and others have shown, mind frames ﬁlter and structure perceptions, evaluations
and narrations of a mission, thus ultimately inﬂuencing the repertoires of legitimate
action.4
In this article, we seek to contribute to a deeper understanding of peacebuilding
culture by analysing the neglected ﬁeld of staff ’s dispositions. We ask whether peace-
builders hold cosmopolitan worldviews, and if so, which kind of cosmopolitanism
they represent. The second, and more important, part of our research question regard-
ing the types of cosmopolitanism only makes sense in a sociological understanding
of the concept. We argue that in order to study cosmopolitanism as mind frame,
we need to distinguish two fundamentally different approaches in cosmopolitanism
1 See particularly Mary Kaldor, ‘Cosmopolitanism and Organised Violence’, paper prepared for conference
Conceiving Cosmopolitanism, Warwick (27–29 April 2000), available at: {http://www.theglobalsite.
ac.uk/press/010kaldor.pdf} acessed 4 June 2012; see also Majbritt Lyck, Peace Operations and Interna-
tional Criminal Justice: Building Peace After Mass Atrocities (London/New York: Routledge, 2009).
2 Michael Sheehan, ‘International Organizations: Careers in International Organizations’, in School of
Foreign Service and Georgetown University (eds), Careers in International Affairs (Washington DC:
Georgetown University Press, 2003), pp. 125–65; Patricia L. Delaney and Michelle D. Carter, ‘Interna-
tional Development: Careers in International Development’, in School of Foreign Service and George-
town University (eds), Careers in International Affairs (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press,
2003), pp. 270–85. For a critical discussion see Maria Eriksson Baaz, The Paternalism of Partnership: A
Postcolonial Reading of Identity in Development Aid (London: Zed Books, 2005).
3 See, for example, Katarina Kruhonja and Margareta Ingelstam, ‘Selecting People, Motivations and
Qualiﬁcations’, in Luc Reychler and Thania Pfaffenholz (eds), Peacebuilding: A Field Guide (Boulder:
Lynne Rienner, 2001), pp. 21–7.
4 Se´ve´rine Autesserre, ‘Hobbes and the Congo: Frames, Local Violence, and International Intervention’,
International Organization, 63 (2009), pp. 249–80; Se´ve´rine Autesserre, The Trouble with the Congo:
Local Violence and the Failure of International Peacebuilding (Cambridge et al.: Cambridge University
Press, 2010); see also Ole Jacob Sending, ‘Why Peacebuilders Fail to Secure Ownership and Be Sensitive
to Context: Security in Practice’, NUPI Working Paper, No. 755 (Oslo: NUPI, 2009).
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research: ﬁrst, a theoretical approach that establishes cosmopolitanism as a liberal-
universalist concept and, second, sociological-empirical analyses, which trace cosmo-
politanism back to its enabling social conditions. It is through the lens of the latter
that we can bring to light the limits of liberal-universalist cosmopolitanism when it
comes to analysing cosmopolitanism in peacebuilding practice.
In our discussion of sociological approaches to cosmopolitanism, we show that
the theoretically assumed link between cosmopolitanism and peacebuilding ﬁts well
for only one particular form, namely localisable cosmopolitanism, which is deeply
rooted in local society and culture. This is supported by two strands of research on
peacebuilding, which in the past decade have emphasised the need for ‘localised’ or,
as it is sometimes called, ‘hybrid’ peacebuilding. On the one hand, many analyses
of peacebuilding, which look at its international implementation and the resulting
problems in terms of practice and legitimacy, have concluded that one crucial ele-
ment missing in the current policy mix of peacebuilding and statebuilding is a deep
engagement with local politics, the local economy and local actors.5 These authors
have therefore concluded that this lack is probably one major cause of the limited
political success of post-conﬂict peacebuilding as it is the most likely cause for its
lack of local legitimacy. The crucial aspect of localising peacebuilding is exactly the
question of legitimacy. It is not enough to promote ‘local ownership’ as it has been
done in many peace missions. As Caroline Hughes and Vanessa Pupavac have
pointed out early on in the debate, one major risk of ‘local ownership’ is that it
becomes shorthand for the local execution of policies, which are deﬁned elsewhere.
Such local ownership does not solve the legitimacy problem with which peacebuild-
ing is confronted; it risks undermining local politics even more.6 Localising peace-
building therefore has its own challenges. It must neither romanticise the local nor
should it become the mere ﬁg leaf of intervention, as Kristoffer Lide´n points out.7
Timothy Donais, for instance, argues for ‘negotiated hybridity’, ‘which is achieved
through a process of consensus-building not only along a horizontal axis among the
wide range of relevant local actors but also along a vertical axis spanning grassroots
civil society, the national government, and the broader international community’.8 A
second direction of ground-oriented research, particularly in conﬂict resolution re-
search, has furthermore shown that local initiatives have often an amazingly positive
impact.9 This research conﬁrms the assumption of critical peacebuilding literature
that local conditions can produce peace despite violent conﬂict. Consequently, it is
5 Autesserre, ‘Hobbes and the Congo’; Autesserre, The Trouble with the Congo; David Chandler, Bosnia:
Faking Democracy After Dayton (2nd edn, London: Pluto Press, 2000); Be´atrice Pouligny, Ils nous
avaient promis la paix: Ope´rations de l’ONU et populations locales (Paris: Sciences Po/Les Presses,
2004); Laura Zanotti, ‘Taming Chaos: A Foucauldian View of UN Peacekeeping, Democracy and
Normalization’, International Peacekeeping, 13:2 (2006), pp. 150–67.
6 Caroline Hughes and Vanessa Pupavac, ‘Framing Post-conﬂict Societies: International Pathologisation
of Cambodia and the Post-Yugoslav States’, Third World Quarterly, 26:6 (2005), pp. 873–89; Chandler,
Bosnia.
7 Kristoffer Lide´n, ‘Building Peace between Global and Local Politics: The Cosmopolitical Ethics of
Liberal Peacebuilding’, International Peacekeeping, 16:5 (2009), pp. 616–34.
8 Timothy Donais, ‘Empowerment or Imposition? Dilemmas of Local Ownership in Post-conﬂict Peace-
building Processes’, Peace and Change, 34:1 (2009), p. 4.
9 Krijn Peters, Footpaths to Reintegration: Armed Conﬂict, Youth and the Rural Crisis in Sierra Leone,
Wageningen University Thesis, 2006, available at: {http://edepot.wur.nl/44295} accessed 20 July 2013;
Susan Stewart, ‘The Role of International and Local NGOs in the Transformation of the Georgian-
Abkhazian Conﬂict’, The Global Review of Ethnopolitics, 3:3–4 (2004), pp. 3–22; Duane Ruth-
Heffelbower, ‘Local Capacities for Peace Meets Conﬂict Resolution Practice’, Journal of Peacebuilding
and Development, 1:1 (2002), pp. 85–97.
Cosmopolitanism and the culture of peacebuilding 773
now a relatively wide-held axiom that localised or ‘hybrid’ peacebuilding is the only
form suited to help anchor peacebuilding in the local societies.10
By setting out to study cosmopolitanism as a mind frame and worldview of
peacebuilders, this article explores entirely uncharted terrain. It starts by discussing
the two main strands of cosmopolitanism scholarship and their connection with
peacebuilding: the theoretical argument of liberal-universalist cosmopolitanism and
three empirical-sociological contestations of the universalist view, namely elite,
glocal, and localised cosmopolitanism. The discussion concludes that the sociological
ﬁndings on cosmopolitanism render the idea of its universality an illusion; rather,
studies of empirical cosmopolitanism hint at varying degrees to which cosmopolitanism
is a suitable worldview for peacebuilders, with the localisable variant the most suited.
In the second part, the article then turns to the question of how to study peacebuilders’
cosmopolitanism empirically. Given the exploratory, novel nature of our research,
we discuss in detail the research and questionnaire designs and analytical indicators
of our study of peacebuilders’ cosmopolitanism in the case of the international
mission in Kosovo. We devote a large section to the methodological discussion
exactly because up to now there has been no systematic sociological research on the
peacebuilders. This might be in part because investigating their attitudes, worldviews,
and habitus poses particular methodological challenges, which will be discussed in
detail in this second section. Speciﬁcally, we introduce the purposive sampling
method and combine it with a mixed-methods approach to address topic-speciﬁc
challenges of determining a research sample in the ever-changing environment of
international interventions and of capturing the multilayered cognitive schemes,
which represent worldviews. In the third part, we then present core ﬁndings of our
interviews with peacebuilders in Kosovo, establishing, that peacebuilders in Kosovo
are cosmopolitans and then turning to the question of which type of cosmopolitanism
they represent. As our ﬁndings show, our interviewees display a mixture of elite and
glocal cosmopolitanism, with a strong tendency towards the elite type; the localised
variant, by contrast, is not present at all. Finally, we discuss the validity and general-
isability of our ﬁndings, before turning to some more general conclusions of our
study for peacebuilding research and, more importantly, practice.
Cosmopolitanism and peacebuilding
Cosmopolitanism and peacebuilding have been associated most commonly on the
basis of a particular analysis of the conﬂicts that have taken place in the past twenty
years. In this analysis, one of the major causes of conﬂict is the diverging lives and
identities of populations, which are confronted with rapid, modernising changes.
Whether this conﬂict analysis is correct or not is not up for discussion in this article.
What we are interested in is the argument that infers from this analysis, namely that
10 Oliver P. Richmond, ‘Resistance and the Post-liberal Peace’, Millenium, 38:3 (2010), pp. 665–92. For
futher discussions see also Susanna Campbell, David Chandler, and Meera Sabaratnam (eds), A Liberal
Peace? The Problems and Practices of Peacebuilding (London: Zed Books, 2011); Oliver P. Richmond
and Audra Mitchell (eds), Hybrid Forms of Peace. From Everyday Agency to Postliberalism (Basing-
stoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012); Roger Mac Ginty and Oliver Richmond, ‘The Local Turn in Peace
Building: A Critical Agenda for Peace’, Third World Quarterly, 34:5 (2013), pp. 763–83; Vivienne Jabri,
‘Peacebuilding, the Local and the International: A Colonial or a Postcolonial Rationality?’, Peace-
building, 1:1 (2013), pp. 3–16.
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cosmopolitanism is essential to rebuild conﬂict societies after war. Mary Kaldor was
probably the ﬁrst and the most outspoken proponent of this view. According to her,
the new wars are paramount to violent clashes of identities:
The political goals of the new wars are about the claim to power on the basis of seemingly
traditional identities – nation, tribe, religion. Yet the upsurge in the politics of particularistic
identities cannot be understood in traditional terms. It has to be explained in the context of
growing cultural dissonance between those who participate in transnational networks, which
communicate through email, faxes, telephone and air travel, and those who are excluded from
global processes and are tied to localities, even though their lives may be profoundly shaped by
those same processes.11
According to this conﬂict analysis, peace can be restored and maintained if such
particularistic identity ﬁssures can be overcome, and to do so requires cosmopolitan
attitudes, which post-conﬂict reconstruction projects have to create and foster.12
As we will argue in the following two sections, however, the ‘perfect match’
between cosmopolitanism and peacebuilding is only plausible when it comes to
cosmopolitanism theory, which is blind for the social conditions that enable cosmo-
politan attitudes to develop in the ﬁrst place. This under-speciﬁcation of the social
conditions of cosmopolitanism is the main critique out of which sociological-
empirical schools of thought on cosmopolitanism have developed.13 In recent re-
search, cosmopolitanism has been understood in various ways: as democratic theory,
as normative or even utopian project, as an individual disposition or as a or the
sociological condition of globalisation. These different perspectives are interrelated
as they draw on a set of shared assumptions, namely that the age of globalisation
requires a speciﬁc ‘worldview’ of openness, tolerance, and non-nationalist solidarity.
These three precepts also underscore the link some authors establish between peace-
building and cosmopolitanism. However, analytically the intermeshing of these
different perspectives makes cosmopolitanism a rather elusive concept. Gavin Kendall,
Ian Woodward, and Zlatko Skrbis argue therefore that the concept needs to be
anchored in sociological analysis: ‘the concept of cosmopolitanism has no socio-
logical usefulness – no reality – if it can not be linked to empirically observable
processes’,14 because we cannot think of any values, ideas, or worldviews which
form in non-social spaces. Even if we wanted to understand cosmopolitanism in
purely ideational terms, we would have to acknowledge that it is a socially constructed
worldview. Analytically, we have to turn our attention therefore to the social condi-
tions of its existence.
In the following section, we ﬁrst brieﬂy discuss the theoretical cosmopolitan argu-
ment. Then, we identify three types of understanding cosmopolitanism as a socially
conditioned worldview – the elite, the glocal, and the localisable cosmopolitanism –
and discuss what their ﬁndings tell us about social conditions and possibilities of
cosmopolitan peacebuilding.
11 Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era (Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 2007), p. 73.
12 Mary Kaldor, ‘A Cosmopolitan Response to New Wars’, Peace Review, 8 (1996), pp. 505–14; Kaldor,
‘Cosmopolitanism and Organised Violence’; Mary Kaldor, Global Civil Society: An Answer to War
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003).
13 See for an overview: Zlatko Skrbis, Gavin Kendall, and Ian Woodward, ‘Locating Cosmopolitanism:
Between Humanist Ideal and Grounded Social Category’, Theory, Culture & Society, 21:6 (2004),
pp. 115–36; Gavin Kendall, Ian Woodward, and Zlatko Skrbis, The Sociology of Cosmopolitanism:
Globalization, Identity, Culture and Government (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009); Magdalena
Nowicka and Maria Rovisco (eds), Cosmopolitanism in Practice (Farnham: Ashgate, 2009).
14 Kendall, Woodward and Skrbis, The Sociology of Cosmopolitanism, p. 35.
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The theoretical argument: liberal-universalist cosmopolitanism
Kaldor’s concept of cosmopolitanism belongs to the universal and liberal form of
cosmopolitanism and is similar to the concepts of David Held or Daniele Archibugi.15
Universal cosmopolitanism ﬁts perfectly well into the overall framework of the liberal
peace as it was identiﬁed by Roland Paris,16 and it underpins discourses on humani-
tarian intervention, the R2P concept and peacebuilding projects.17
Held and Garret W. Brown point to ‘three corresponding moral and normative
commitments’, which are central to universalist cosmopolitanism as political theory:
cosmopolitans believe that the primary units of moral concern are individual human beings,
not states or other forms of communitarian or political association. Although this does not
rule out localised obligations . . . [A] cosmopolitan commitment to the individual translates
into an impartial commitment that can respect all human beings equally . . . cosmopolitanism
is universal in its scope, . . . as if we are all citizens of the world.18
Held and Brown clearly claim the liberal pedigree of the concept and argue that
liberal democracy is a practical and institutional solution for almost any kind of
problem we encounter in the process of globalisation. Martha Nussbaum and Robert
Fine who also advocate a universal cosmopolitanism as a remedy against violence,
conﬂict, and barbarism second them.19
This kind of cosmopolitanism is entirely theoretical. Neither Kaldor nor Nussbaum
or Held specify which kind of people can be or are already cosmopolitans, nor
are they concerned with the conditions of possibility of such a universal cosmo-
politanism. The only concession in this direction might be Nussbaum’s plea for
liberal arts education; yet here too, she emphasises that cosmopolitanism is a state
of mind that can be achieved through various means of which classical philosophy
is but one.20 In Nussbaum’s account the cosmopolitan identity will add onto other
particular identities (national or race or gender), yet, it should be the one that counts
when it comes to encounters with ‘the stranger’. How this is to be translated into
practical terms remains largely unclear.
The positive relationship between cosmopolitanism and peacebuilding, which
Kaldor originally formulated, incorporated the idea that such a cosmopolitan stand-
point would be neutral and that it was exactly this outsider standpoint that would be
15 David Held, Democracy and the Global Order (Stanford: Standford University Press, 1995); David
Held, Cosmopolitanism: Ideals and Realities (London: Polity Press, 2010); Daniele Archibugi and David
Held (eds), Cosmopolitan Democracy: An Agenda for a New World Order (Cambridge: Polity Press,
1995); Daniele Archibugi, The Global Commonwealth of Citizens: Toward Cosmopolitan Democracy
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008).
16 Roland Paris, At War’s End: Building Peace After Civil Conﬂict (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2004).
17 Andrew Linklater, ‘Citizenship, Humanity, and Cosmopolitan Harm Conventions’, International Political
Science Review, 22:3 (2001), pp. 261–77; Andrew Linklater, ‘Distant Suffering and Cosmopolitan Obliga-
tions’, International Politics, 44 (2007), pp. 19–36.
18 David Held and Garrett W. Brown (eds), The Cosmopolitanism Reader (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2011),
p. 2, emphasis in original.
19 Martha C. Nussbaum, ‘Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism’, The Boston Review, Oct/Nov (1994), avail-
able at: {http://bostonreview.net/BR19.5/nussbaum.php} accessed 3 June 2012; Martha C. Nussbaum,
‘Symposium on Cosmopolitanism. Duties of Justice, Duties of Material Aid: Cicero’s Problematic
Legacy’, Journal of Political Philosophy, 8:2 (2000), pp. 176–206; Robert Fine, Cosmopolitanism
(Abingdon: Routledge, 2007).
20 Martha C. Nussbaum, Not for Proﬁt: Why Democracy Needs the Humanities (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2012).
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beneﬁcial to peacebuilding. As they are detached and removed from the everyday
identity haggling, external peacebuilders can adjudicate principles of good governance
in post-conﬂict societies. They are not involved in the past conﬂicts and they are
not concerned by parochial interests and identities because they are cosmopolitans.
According to Kaldor (and others like Held or Archibugi), the best mind frame for a
peacebuilder to hold is therefore universal cosmopolitanism.
Sociological-empirical contestations: elite, glocal, and localisable cosmopolitanism
Universal cosmopolitanism has been accused by other strands of the cosmopolitanism
literature of being too abstract to be meaningful and without respect for the culturally
speciﬁc ways in which localities give meaning to cosmopolitanism. The three alterna-
tive interpretations discussed below all refer to cosmopolitanism simultaneously as
an individual attitude and a way to live, and as a collective social and political project.
Based on the social conditions they deem crucial for cosmopolitanism to develop,
however, these interpretations vary in the degree to which cosmopolitanism is seen
to be exclusive/inclusive and superﬁcial/central in the identities and mind frames of
individuals. As we will show, the social conditions discussed by these contenders of
the universalist view have a major effect on the possibility of realising the universalist
normative aspirations Kaldor, Held, and others have expressed for cosmopolitanism.
And they also articulate the relationship between cosmopolitans and locals very
differently, making cosmopolitanism appear more or less suitable for the promotion
of a ‘cosmopolitan peace’ in a post-conﬂict society.
The ﬁrst of these competing interpretations, elite cosmopolitanism, contests the
existence of a class-unspeciﬁc cosmopolitanism. According to this view, cosmopoli-
tanism is rooted in class-speciﬁc practices and biographical itineraries, and that it
is exactly the class character that makes this bundle of attitudes and lifestyles cosmo-
politan. Craig Calhoun, as a main proponent of this view, argues that cosmopolitan-
ism itself is particular as it reﬂects one speciﬁc type of Western, liberal elite culture.21
Being a cosmopolitan means, according to Calhoun, belonging to a speciﬁc social
class, namely the educated, urban, upper-middle class of Western countries, and to
advocate ideas and values which are particular and cherished in Western culture
such as individualism, freedom, and rights. He furthermore contends that these
values, because they are historically, socially, and institutionally rooted in Western
nations, are particular national values.22 Merely eating curry and practicing yoga
are not enough to overcome the speciﬁcally Western character of cosmopolitanism,
all the more these practices have been ‘Westernised’ rather than the Westerners
having been ‘orientalised’.23
Calhoun speciﬁcally discusses the education necessary for cosmopolitanism and
identiﬁes this as the key characteristic that makes cosmopolitanism particularly western.
He points out that the education itself, its content and associated values matter but
21 Craig J. Calhoun, ‘The Class Consciousness of Frequent Travelers: Toward a Critique of Actually
Existing Cosmopolitanism’, South Atlantic Quarterly, 101:4 (2002), pp. 869–97.
22 Craig J. Calhoun, Nations Matter: Culture, History and the Cosmopolitan Dream (London/New York:
Routledge, 2007).
23 Craig J. Calhoun, ‘Cosmopolitanism in the Modern Social Imaginary’, Daedalus, 137:3 (2008), pp. 105–
14.
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also the institution in which the education was received. According to Calhoun, it is
a speciﬁc class of Western educational institutions, like ‘Oxbridge’ in the UK or the
Ivy League in the US, which produce cosmopolitans and the social networks through
which cosmopolitans globalise and socialise.24 It is through this institutional moment
that cosmopolitanism becomes exclusive and is exactly not universal.
As with regard to peacebuilding, cosmopolitanism in this reading does not appear
to be a ‘better’ or ‘more suitable’ mind frame for peacebuilders than any other
political attitude or worldview. While in its discourse and worldviews elite cosmo-
politanism does not differ from universal cosmopolitanism, it is not unspeciﬁc as to the
social background of the people who hold cosmopolitan ideas: elite cosmopolitanism
is, by deﬁnition, exclusive, as becoming a cosmopolitan requires passing through a
very speciﬁc set of educational and social institutions. If Calhoun’s assumptions are
true, then creating cosmopolitan societies through peacebuilding, however desirable
in theory, is in practice an impossible task.
In terms of empirical manifestation among peacebuilders, elite cosmopolitans
would be expected to share the normative expressions of universal cosmopolitanism,
but with a clearly recognisable sociological background of Western, highly educated,
urban, and middle-class origin shared by the large majority of peacebuilders. Further-
more, discourses of ‘Westernising’ the world would be part of the observation, that
is, the integration of non-Western symbols, narratives, events and ﬁgures as if they
were Western and with a strictly Western interpretation, as exempliﬁed by the iconic
character of images such as of Che Guevara, which bear little resemblance to the real
existing, historical ﬁgure.25
Glocal cosmopolitanism, a second strand of empirical-sociological research that
contests the liberal-universalist view, concurs with the elite variant in its understand-
ing of cosmopolitanism as socially embedded; yet it is much less elite-centred and
exclusive. Its proponents see cosmopolitanism as an attitude of tolerance and a
cross-cultural competence that results from professional encounters with globalisa-
tion and that can be found in some form or another among various social classes.
Based on empirical research on cosmopolitan attitudes of populations confronted
with increasing globalisation demands or immigration, several studies have found
that cosmopolitanism commonly correlates to education and profession. Vertovec,
for instance, draws attention to the large variety of forms of assimilation which
migrants experience and how these feed into new forms of cosmopolitan spaces.26
In a similar vein, Roudometof argues that the large diversity of transnational ﬂows
and connections creates a variety of local-global relationships. This variety of
cosmopolitanisms can be analysed along a continuum from thin cosmopolitanism to
thick. He assumes that experiences of transnationalism and worldliness merge. The
degree to which people participate in transnational practices and develop on their
24 Calhoun, ‘The Class Consciousness of Frequent Travelers’. On the relation between educational institu-
tions and social mobility see also Orsetta Causa, Sophie Dantan, and Asa Johansson, ‘Intergenerational
Social Mobility in European OECD Countries’, OECD Economics Department Working Papers,
No. 709 (Paris: OECD, 2009).
25 See in more detail: Jeffa A. Larson and Omor Lizardo, ‘Generations, Identities, and the Collective
Memory of Che Guevara’, Sociological Forum, 22:4 (2007), pp. 425–51; Michael Casey, Che’s Afterlife:
The Legacy of an Image (New York: Vintage Books, 2009); Fre´de´ric Maguet, ‘Le portrait de Che
Guevara. Comment la parole vient a` l’icoˆne’, Gradhiva, 11 (2010), pp. 140–61.
26 Steven Vertovec, Transnationalism (London/New York: Routledge, 2009).
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grounds attitudes of tolerance makes them develop cosmopolitan attitudes of varying
‘thickness’.27
Steffen Mau et al. have found that intensiﬁed cross-border communication and
travel increase the acceptance of globalisation, yet the openness to strangers and
foreign cultures is more signiﬁcantly determined by the level of education of their
respondents.28 Skrbis et al. and Woodward et al. ﬁnd a more ambiguous relation
between globalisation, cosmopolitanism, and the acceptance of strange cultures. In
their review of empirical research, they ﬁnd high levels of adaptation to the require-
ments and challenges of globalisation in many different social classes, even if these
requirements are not directly experienced but mediated.29 They label people who
show such ‘cosmopolitan dispositions’ by mediation ‘sedentary glocals’.30
What all these studies underline is that much of cosmopolitan openness results
from adaptive behaviour to the requirements of a globalising professional world.
Furthermore, they all interpret cosmopolitanism as an attitude and a lifestyle
through which people integrate the larger world beyond their national borders into
their daily lives. Ulrich Beck has called this form of mixing local and ‘foreign’
cultures through daily practices and in daily lives ‘glocalism’; he argues that it is
the oscillation between a large variety of cultures in the daily multicultural lives
of modern citizens that allows for a particular tolerant move beyond national and
parochial cultures.31
In glocal cosmopolitanism the openness and tolerance of the universal cosmo-
politanism is translated practically into a mix-and-match assemblage of various
cultural elements, none of which being necessarily and particularly national-speciﬁc
elements, but more centred around professional imperatives and educational com-
petences. It is noteworthy that Beck’s analysis and also that of other proponents of
glocal cosmopolitanism largely refers to urban settings. Glocal cosmopolitanism is
said to exist particularly in what Saskia Sassen has called global cities.32 Global cities
provide the economic environment in which people from all over the world meet in
professional exchange and also in, albeit very selectively structured, living spaces.
The amalgam of lifestyles in world cities diffuses cosmopolitanism as lifestyle as
well as an attitude of openness, tolerance and melange on all cultural levels, whether
in high culture (for example, theatre or literature) or in popular culture (popular
music, fashion, etc.).33 Unlike elite cosmopolitanism, glocal cosmopolitanism can,
to a certain extent, be considered as being malleable to local particularities. Yet, in
27 Victor Roudometof, ‘Transnationalism, Cosmopolitanism and Glocalization’, Current Sociology, 53:1
(2005), pp. 113–35; see also Anna Olofsson and Susanna Ohman, ‘Cosmopolitans and Locals: An
Empirical Investigation of Transnationalism’, Current Sociology, 55:6 (2007), pp. 877–95.
28 Steffen Mau, Jan Mewes, and Ann Zimmermann, ‘Cosmopolitan Attitudes Through Transnational
Social Practices?’, Global Networks, 8:1 (2008), pp. 1–24.
29 Skrbis, Kendall and Woodward, ‘Locating Cosmopolitanism’; Ian Woodward, Zlatko Skrbis, and Clive
Bean, ‘Attitudes Towards Globalization and Cosmopolitanism: Cultural Diversity, Personal Consump-
tion and the National Economy’, British Journal of Sociology, 59:2 (2008), pp. 207–26.
30 Woodward, Skrbis, and Bean, ‘Attitudes Towards Globalization and Cosmopolitanism’, p. 121.
31 Ulrich Beck, The Cosmopolitan Vision (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006); Ulrich Beck, ‘The Cosmopolitan
Manifesto’, in David Held and Garrett W. Brown (eds), The Cosmopolitanism Reader (Cambridge et al.:
Polity Press, 2011), pp. 217–28; Ulrich Beck and Edgar Grande, ‘Cosmopolitanism: Europe’s Way Out
of Crisis’, European Journal of Social Theory, 10:1 (2007), pp. 67–85.
32 Saskia Sassen, Cities in a World Economy (4th edn, Thousand Oaks: Sage, 2012).
33 Christina Horvath, ‘The Cosmopolitan City’, in Maria Rovisco and Magdalena Nowicka (eds), The
Ashgate Research Companion to Cosmopolitanism (Farnham and Burlington: Ashgate, 2011).
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this case the localisation results rather coincidentally from contingent encounters
(people have to live together) and the educational baggage of cosmopolitans to under-
stand other cultures.
In the case of peacebuilding, we would expect this form of cosmopolitanism to
emerge in the course of an intervention through the sharing of work practices and
daily lives, rather than at its outset, as the liberal-universalist model assumes. Yet
empirically, glocal cosmopolitanism among peacebuilders would need a predis-
position for such an encounter. A glocal cosmopolitan mind frame would be one
of a person who is used to multicultural encounters on many different levels and
who has been socialised into easily assimilating cultural differences. First, such
cosmopolitan attitudes would be articulated mainly around professional questions
of the speciﬁc mission or the UN job in general. Peacebuilders would continue to
mark clear instances of distinguishing ‘home’ and ‘abroad’, showing an element of
comparison, yet they would also emphasise their own assimilation to this foreign
culture. In their way of presenting themselves they would mention a large variety of
references drawn from both local and global cultures. In terms of sociological features,
we would expect a large variety of geographical, educational, and social backgrounds
as glocalism emerges with the professional life and the experience of abroad (immigrat-
ing or emigrating) rather than being anchored in elitist types of education or educa-
tional institutions. However, we would also expect the respondents to have grown up
in metropolitan environments in which they have become socialised to the multi-
culturalism that characterises glocal cosmopolitanism.
The third variant of contestation to the liberal-universalist view, localisable
cosmopolitanism, explicitly thematises the possibility (and political necessity) of a
locally rooted cosmopolitanism. David Harvey, as major proponent of this variant,
focuses on indigenous social movements and the way local populations deal with
their encounter of globalising forces.34 In some agreement with Calhoun, Harvey argues
that cosmopolitanism is a particular culture, yet it is merely one culture among others
and one which cannot be universal as its conceptions of rights, justice, fairness, etc.
necessarily contradict local practices; local practices are, on the other hand, always
particular and strange to the outsider. Harvey insists that there might be other forms
of cosmopolitanisms but locally rooted ones, and this is what only experience on the
ground can tell. Yet, in order to allow for such experience, cosmopolitanism has to
be alert and sensitive to local particularities, something that concepts of universal
cosmopolitanism cannot offer.
There is . . . something oppressive about the ethereal and abstracted universalism that typically
lies at the heart of any purely moral discourse. How can cosmopolitanism account for, let
alone be sympathetic to, a world characterized by class divisions, multicultural diversity,
movements for national or ethnic liberation, multiple forms of identity politics, and all manner
of other anthropological, ecological, and geographical differences?35
Harvey’s scepticism casts doubts on the beneﬁts of universal cosmopolitanism as
foundation for global activism. According to Harvey, meaningful political action
has to be based on local knowledge and exactly the ‘familiarity’ that results from
deep roots in a given locality.36 Harvey disputes that universalism is an appropriate
34 David Harvey, Cosmopolitanism and the Geographies of Freedom (New York: Columbia University
Press, 2009).
35 Ibid., 80.
36 Ibid., p. 97.
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attitude towards the speciﬁc and the local; cosmopolitanism has to be localised. Uni-
versalism must not be expressed by uniform inputs into speciﬁc cultures, territories
and people but has to be articulated centrally within these spaces and their cultures,
norms and histories. In this sense, glocal cosmopolitanism can, but does not have to,
add up to localisable cosmopolitanism. Contrary to glocal cosmopolitanism, localis-
able cosmopolitanism is not a multicultural amalgam, a sort of metropolitan culture
of its own, but a world openness that is born out of deep knowledge of and custom-
ariness with the local world.
Yet Harvey’s criticism of universal cosmopolitanism goes further: he points out
that it might be more part of the problem of external interventions in local events
(like peacebuilding) than its solution. He is particularly critical of the idea that a
standard of cosmopolitanism would already exist against which the degree of cosmo-
politanism of people could be measured:
There is, however, an odd tendency in much of the new cosmopolitanism to assume that more
or less adequate models of democracy have already been constructed within the framework of
the leading nation-states and that the only problem remaining is to ﬁnd ways to extend these
models across all jurisdictions.37
By ‘new cosmopolitanism’ he means mainly Held and Nussbaum, but Kaldor’s
cosmopolitanism also ﬁts the description. Harvey bases this critique on two observa-
tions, namely that a number of cosmopolitan projects in the West, like the European
integration process, are not achieving entirely the democratic participation they aspire
to; and that much of the globalisation we observe follows rather a capitalist, market-
induced, and he would say ‘neoliberal’ impetus than an emancipatory, humanist
project. He sees therefore, if the emancipatory, humanist aspect of cosmopolitanism
is to be preserved, a necessity for opportunities of local resistance and resilience
against this kind of universal ‘new’ cosmopolitanism.
Harvey’s call for an emancipatory cosmopolitanism is mirrored by recent litera-
ture on emancipatory approaches to peacebuilding. There has been a lot of research
into the causes for the very limited success of peacebuilding over the past twenty
years.38 One central ﬁnding is that peacebuilding creates situations of hybrid peace
where the externally imposed institutions are at least formally accepted, yet where
local populations also resist, openly or in subverted forms, these same institutions
and where alternative, local (or localised) forms of institutions persist.39
Consequently, a meanwhile common recommendation is to allow for genuine
local ownership and to root the power over peacebuilding in the local population,
that is, to establish an emancipatory or post-liberal peace.40 By post-liberal peace
37 Ibid., p. 86.
38 Recent overviews include: Berit Bliesemann de Guevara, ‘Introduction: Statebuilding and State-Forma-
tion’, in Berit Bliesemann de Guevara (ed.), Statebuilding and State-Formation: The Political Sociology
of Intervention (London/New York: Routledge, 2012), pp. 1–20; Roger Mac Ginty, International Peace-
building and Local Resistance: Hybrid Forms of Peace (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011);
Edward Newman, Roland Paris, and Oliver Richmond (eds), New Perspectives on Liberal Peacebuilding
(Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2009); Roland Paris and Timothy D. Sisk (eds), The Dilemmas
of Statebuilding: Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations (reprinted, London:
Routledge, 2010); Richmond and Mitchell, Hybrid Forms of Peace.
39 Mac Ginty, International Peacebuilding and Local Resistance, p. 84.
40 Oliver P. Richmond, The Transformation of Peace (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005); Oliver
P. Richmond and Jason Franks, Liberal Peace Transitions: Between Statebuilding and Peacebuilding
(Edinburg: Edinburgh University Press, 2009).
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Richmond and Franks, for instance, mean a ‘liberal peace but in a localised, con-
textual and hybridised form’, which is built, among other things, on ‘a detailed
understanding (rather than co-option or ‘tolerance’) of local culture, traditions and
ontology and
should result in a process whereby a hybrid, possibly indigenous peace is installed that includes
a version of human rights, rule of law, and a representative political process that reﬂects the
local groupings and their agency and ability to create consensus, as well as broader interna-
tional expectations for peace (but not alien ‘national’ interests).41
Although the localising approach is often accused of being at risk of ‘romanticising’
the local,42 there is widespread agreement that at least local elites have to be integrated
in peacebuilding efforts, if they are to be sustainable.43 The ﬁnding that local initiatives
might work much better than global approaches to peace ﬁnds conﬁrmation in a
number of local peace and reconciliation projects.44
If we follow this newer literature on peacebuilding and combine it with our
discussion of cosmopolitanism, then localisable cosmopolitanism seems the most
appropriate mind frame allowing peacebuilders to interact meaningfully with local
populations and to identify possibilities and conditions of local ownership of the
peacebuilding process. Localisable cosmopolitanism is best characterised by what
many observers would call ‘going native’. In terms of empirical manifestation, we
would expect that peacebuilders show good knowledge of local circumstances,
maybe speak local languages, and that they refer frequently and colloquially to local
events, people, locations, idioms, etc. World images would reﬂect a mixture of
culturally speciﬁc values and ideas with universal and Western discourses. Ideational
and political references would be drawn from local circumstances rather than from
home or global experiences.
The conceptual discussion above suggests that the social conditions that give
birth to (variants of ) cosmopolitanism are of essential importance, if we are to argue
that cosmopolitanism contributes to peacebuilding. Evidently, this only becomes
a problem, if it is accepted that cosmopolitanism is not, in reality, universal and
uniform among all cosmopolitans. Indeed, the inherent ideas of communication and
dialogue are very different in the various forms of cosmopolitanism and therefore
imply varying effects on the local-international relationship. With the question in
mind whether cosmopolitanism can promote emancipatory or post-liberal peace, we
need to carefully distinguish the possibilities for inclusive and context-sensitive rela-
tions between internationals and locals that result from elite cosmopolitanism, glocal
cosmopolitanism, and localisable cosmopolitanism respectively.
Elite cosmopolitanism is least likely to contribute to cosmopolitan peace, as it
is based on peacebuilders’ exclusive social background, rendering the idea of univer-
salism an illusion. Being ﬁrmly rooted in Western values, elite cosmopolitanism is
just as ‘good’ or ‘bad’ a disposition for peacebuilding as any other attitude or world-
view. Peacebuilders whose cosmopolitanism is predominantly of the elite type are
41 Richmond and Franks, Liberal Peace Transitions, pp. 212–13.
42 Mac Ginty, International Peacebuilding and Local Resistance, p. 51.
43 Michael Barnett and Christoph Zuercher, ‘The Peacebuilder’s Contract: How External Statebuilding
Reinforces Weak Statehood’, in Roland Paris and Timothy D. Sisk (eds), The Dilemmas of Statebuild-
ing: Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations (London: Routledge, 2009), pp. 23–52;
Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace
Operations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006); Pouligny, Ils nous avaient promis la paix.
44 See fn. 10.
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thus not more suited than non-cosmopolitans to support locally owned peace pro-
cesses. Glocal cosmopolitanism, by contrast, is much more open with regard to social
backgrounds and is determined by education and, more importantly, a globalising
professional world, which does not only affect the elite of global managers but
also poor labour migrants. While glocal cosmopolitanism can be malleable to local
particularities, for example as an effect of interactions between local and inter-
national counterparts in UN missions, such localisation would rather result coin-
cidentally and does thus not constitute a ‘recipe’ for locally sensitive peacebuilding.
It is only the third type, localisable cosmopolitanism, which explicitly looks for
possibilities of marrying the aim of, in this case, peacebuilding with the local world.
Investigating peacebuilders’ cosmopolitanism empirically
The question that is empirically at the centre in this article is which kind of cosmo-
politanism is represented by peacebuilders. Based on previous studies on UN personnel
and on professionals in similar globalised jobs we could safely assume that the majority
of people working in international organisations and in post-conﬂict environments
share cosmopolitan attitudes – if we take the base deﬁnition of worldly openness,
tolerance, and non-national solidarity. Magdalena Nowicka particularly has investi-
gated cosmopolitan dispositions among UN staff.45 Thomas Weiss et al. present a
large range of biographies of high UN executive staff in their book UN Voices, and
although the question of cosmopolitanism is not at the foreground of their investiga-
tion, it transpires all accounts.46 Also, in a survey undertaken by the UN employee
magazine UN Special in 2002 a large percentage of UN employees declared having
joined the UN for ‘idealistic reasons/beliefs in the United Nations’.47 This pattern is
similar to other globalised professions such as foreign newspaper correspondents,48
humanitarian or other volunteer overseas workers,49 the ‘pioneers’ of global NGOs,50
or expatriate academics51.
However, as argued above, it is the type of cosmopolitanism that makes a
difference, as not all types will actually enhance the possibilities for context-sensitive
45 Magdalena Nowicka, Transnational Professionals and their Cosmopolitan Universes (Frankfurt a.M.:
Campus, 2006); Magdalena Nowicka and Ramin Kaweh, ‘Looking at the Practice of UN Professionals:
Strategies for Managing Differences and the Emergence of a Cosmopolitan Identity’, in Magdalena
Nowicka and Maria Rovisco (eds), Cosmopolitanism in Practice (Farnham: Ashgate, 2009), pp. 51–71.
46 Thomas G. Weiss, Tatiana Carayannis, Louis Emmerij, and Richard Jolly, UN Voices: The Struggle for
Development and Social Justice (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005).
47 Jean-Marc Coicaud, ‘International Organizations as a Profession: Professional Mobility and Power
Distribution’, United Nations University, World Institute for Development Economics Research Paper,
No. 109 (2006), p. 17.
48 Ulf Hannerz, ‘Foreign Correspondents and the Varieties of Cosmopolitanism’, Journal of Ethnic and
Migration Studies, 33:2 (2007), pp. 299–313.
49 Sheena Hudson and Kerr Inkson, ‘Volunteer Overseas Development Workers: The Hero’s Adventure
and Personal Information’, Career Development International, 11:4 (2006), pp. 304–20; Pascal Dauvin,
‘Etre un Professional de l’Humanitaire ou Comment Composer Avec le Cadre Impose´’, Revue Tiers
Monde, 45:180 (2004), pp. 825–40; Pacal Dauvin and Johanna Sime´ant, Le Travail Humanitaire: Les
Acteurs des ONG du Sie`ge au Terrain (Paris: Lavoisier, 2002).
50 Paola Grenier, ‘The New Pioneers: The People Behind Global Civil Society’, in Helmut Anheier,
Marlies Glasius, and Mary Kaldor (eds), Global Civil Society 2004–2005 (London: Sage, 2005),
p. 122–57.
51 Jan Selmer and Jakob Lauring, ‘Cultural Similarity and Adjustment of Expatriate Academics’, Interna-
tional Journal of Intercultural Relations, 33:5 (2009), pp. 429–36.
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and inclusive international-local relations in peacebuilding. For this analysis we
therefore expected a basic cosmopolitan disposition without, however, pre-empting
one. It remained an empirical question to explore if and in how far the cosmopolitan
disposition was indeed present. Yet, in the context of this study the more detailed
question to explore was, going even further, which type of cosmopolitanism, if any,
the respondents represented.
The research design
In order to answer our research question, we are using data that was generated in the
research project, ‘Who governs? A sociological analysis of UNMIK’.52 The aim of
this research project was twofold: ﬁrst, to identify the social conditions for a career
in the United Nations Mission in Kosovo and, second, to analyse more broadly the
worldviews associated with these careers. The present research question is considered
to be part of the second objective.
The careers and worldviews of international organisations’ staff is generally an
understudied ﬁeld and this is particularly so if speciﬁc policy areas are considered.
In the case of peacebuilding, the research project ‘Who governs?’ explored entirely
uncharted terrain. One reason for this might be the quite daunting methodological
challenges that an ideational-sociological analysis of peacebuilding throws up.
The phenomenon of peacebuilding is inherently unbound. Disputes exist already
about the deﬁnition of peacebuilding, its activities and the number and kind of actors
involved.53 Given the arbitrariness of peacebuilding’s boundaries, any research on
the practice of peacebuilding will be, naturally, drawing arbitrary lines. This is
particularly so because it is impossible to obtain a statistically proper sample of this
population for the very simple reason that the base population from which such
a sample would be drawn is not determinate. The boundaries of the peacebuilding
population are ill-deﬁned for two reasons: ﬁrst, various organisations are involved
in peacebuilding, and, second, organisations as well as staff move constantly into
and out of the ﬁeld. The other possibility of obtaining statistically valid data would
have been a complete inventory count at any given point in time. Yet, when asked,
the UN refused to authorise a census survey under the pretext that such a project
would be ‘politically sensitive’ (without, however, specifying if this would be the
case with respect to the situation in Kosovo or the internal politics of the UN).54
Consequently, the ﬁrst decision taken in the research project ‘Who governs?’ was to
undertake an exploration of the ﬁeld with a judgment sample.55 Judgment sampling,
also known as snowball sampling, purposive or targeted sampling, is a cost-economic
and time-convenient way of reaching hard-to-access populations.56 It is often counted
among qualitative research methods, as it does not allow statistical inferences
52 British Academy large research grant LRG-45483.
53 See for the most recent account: Robert Jenkins, Peacebuilding: From Concept to Commission (Abingdon:
Routledge, 2012).
54 Email conversation with Human Resources, August 2007.
55 See for a discussion: A. N. Oppenheim, Questionnaire Design, Interviewing and Attitude Measurement
(London/New York: Continuum Books, 1992), pp. 43, seqq.
56 Janice Penrod, Deborah B. Preston, Richard E. Cain, and Michael T. Starks, ‘A Discussion of Chain
Referral as a Method of Sampling Hard-to-Reach Populations’, Journal of Transcultural Nursing, 14:2
(2003), pp. 100–7.
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grounded in stochastic assumptions of representativity. However, it is an expedient
method of data collection, and in cases of indeterminate populations it is often the
only feasible one.57
Although judgment sampling is a very practical method to obtain data, its non-
stochastic nature risks introducing important biases. This poses obvious problems of
validity. The researcher therefore has to be fully aware that the ﬁndings of a survey
with purposive sampling can only be explorative and need to await further conﬁrma-
tion by other methods.58 Yet, a number of precautions in the research design and
a mixed-method approach as well as a reﬂexive epistemology to the research can
alleviate the limitations of purposive sampling.59
For the current discussion of cosmopolitanism and peacebuilding, this article will
focus on the presentation of the research design that integrated a mixed-method
approach. The ﬁrst step of sampling was to establish a proﬁle of the sample. This
was done using various sources: documentation on stafﬁng by UN agencies, particu-
larly those related to peacebuilding, NGOs, and associated international agencies;
secondary literature;60 expert interviews; explorative interviews with current or
former UN staff; own observations of the principal investigator and the research
assistants from prior research projects.
From these sources a proﬁle was established that postulated the following criteria
for the purposive sample: slightly more male than female interviewees (although
overall the gender ratio of the United Nations is 30/70, all experts and explorative
interviewees agreed that in the case of UNMIK the gender ratio was rather 50/50);
a mix of staff from the UN, the OSCE, and the EU as the three main agencies active
within UNMIK; a broad mix of nationalities and, if possible, multinationals in order
to provide ‘material’ for our questions about transcultural issues, including cosmo-
politanism; a disregard for political afﬁliation as there was general agreement among
experts and former staff that these are extremely difﬁcult to assess (particularly as
most do not vote regularly); a preponderance of the age group 25–40 years old as
this group was considered the most dominant by all experts and by the explorative
interviews.
Two further decisions on sampling concerned the professional status of the
interviewees. Within the staff of these organisations, only civilian staff would be
interviewed as we cannot assume that military staff who are tied into command
structures participated in peacekeeping out of their own will. Another restriction
was the focus on professional groups as we assumed that these are more involved in
decision-making and policy formulation than technical or administrative staff. Ulti-
mately, the research wants to contribute to a better understanding of peacebuilding;
hence, a focus on what could be labelled the policymakers within the organisation
seemed more appropriate.
57 Gary T. Henry, Practical Sampling (London: Sage, 1990), p. 23; Martin N. Marshall, ‘Sampling for
Qualitative Research’, Family Practice, 13:6 (1996), pp. 522–5.
58 Henry, Practical Sampling, p. 24.
59 There is also an interesting epistemological discussion to lead about the nature of biases in stochastic
sampling and non-stochastic sampling; to do so in this article, however, would go far beyond its
purpose.
60 Nowicka and Kaweh, ‘Looking at the Practice of UN Professionals’; Coicaud, ‘International Organiza-
tions as a Profession’; Grenier, ‘The New Pioneers’.
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The proﬁle was crucial for the selection of participants, yet in order to avoid a
selection bias through too strict rigidity of the proﬁle, the principal investigator and
researcher discussed the selection at various intervals of the process. As Janice M.
Morse et al. argue, responsiveness of the researcher is an important means to avoid
that the inherent targeting of purposive sampling becomes a researcher bias.61 The
research design did not deﬁne a top-limit of the sample but interviews were solicited
until a saturation effect settled in, until it appeared to the researchers that no funda-
mentally different answers were obtained from new participants.
The questionnaire design
Particular attention was given to the questionnaire design and the actual interview.
Given that purposive sampling does not allow fully exploiting data stochastically,
and that it should be rather considered a qualitative method, the questionnaire and
interview had to provide deep insights. Charles Ragin points out that studies using
single or small-n number of cases have to provide deep knowledge in order to pro-
duce insights that allow the abstraction necessary to construct categories that allow
further large-n analysis.62
In the current study, the aim of the interviews was twofold: to produce deep
insights into the worldviews and sociological background of people working in
peacebuilding missions, and, second, to do so in order to compare them among
themselves and eventually with other professional groups. In order to allow for com-
parability and, at least, descriptive frequency analysis as well as explorative analysis
the questionnaire had to follow a minimally standardised format. It consisted
therefore of a mix of open questions, scaled evaluations, and batteries of items (the
latter was preferred over single-item questions in order to impress a time-economic
approach on the interviewees).
The rationale of the questionnaire structure was ﬁrst to follow the three parts of
the research question: (a) to ask for information on the personal, family and educa-
tional background; (b) to ask for worldviews; and (c) to ask more precisely for work-
ing routines and career trajectories. Consequently, the questionnaire consisted of
three parts. The second section is the most important for the results discussed here.
Two examples of successful scrutiny for worldviews guided the questionnaire
design: Pierre Bourdieu’s study on ‘taste’ and ‘academic excellence’,63 and the
more mundane, nevertheless very successful ‘Marcel Proust’ questionnaire that the
German newspaper Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, among others, is submitting
weekly to a German ﬁgure of public life.64 These studies all share the commonality
61 Janice M. Morse, Michael Barrett, Maria Mayan, Karin Olson, and Jude Spiers, ‘Veriﬁcation Strategies
for Establishing Reliability and Validity in Qualitative Research’, International Journal of Qualitative
Methods, 1:2 (2002), pp. 17–18.
62 Charles C. Ragin, The Comparative Method: Moving Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies
(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1989).
63 Pierre Bourdieu, La Distinction. Critique sociale du jugement (Paris: Les e´ditions de minuit, 1979); Pierre
Bourdieu, Homo academicus (Paris, Les e´ditions de minuit, 1984).
64 For the questionnaire (with the original answers by Proust) see Vanity Fair, ‘Proust Questionnaire:
Marcel Proust’ (April 2005), available at: {http://www.vanityfair.com/culture/features/2005/04/proust_
proust200504} accessed 21 June 2013; see also Georg Hensel and Volker Hage, Indiskrete Antworten:
Der Fragebogen des F.A.Z.-Magazins (Mu¨nchen: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1990).
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that they piece together the worldviews (or dispositions as Bourdieu would rather
say) like a mosaic, combining appreciations of art, literature, and music. A similar
approach was used in this questionnaire. Worldviews are rarely represented by con-
sistent sets of values and they are context dependent. Worldviews are not precise,
factual, or rational accounts of the world. They should rather be understood as
cognitive schemes through which people perceive something to be right or wrong.
They are partly intuitive as they are formed from a large variety of sources over
long socialisation processes in family, professions, educational institutions, etc.
Because worldviews are complex, intuitive and often contradictory, simply asking
people ‘What is your worldview?’ would barely have produced any results.65
Consequently, the concept of worldview had to be broken down into its smaller
units.66 In a ﬁrst step it was assumed (in line with Bourdieu’s work) that worldviews
are not independent from the social status a person has within a given social ﬁeld, as
the material conditions of an upbringing determine very much the terms of socialisa-
tion (for example, a child from a working-class family is unlikely to have access to
a school that teaches ancient Greek and therefore unlikely to experience discussing
Aristotle’s ethics). The ﬁrst section of the interview asking for family background
and education served the purpose of locating the social position of the respondents.
This was furthermore important as a distinguishing factor between different empirical-
sociological cosmopolitanism types, especially to differentiate between the elite and
glocal variants.
In a second step, the concept of worldviews was distinguished as meaning primarily
worldviews concerning the polity. ‘Politics’ or ‘political’ is, in this context, writ large
as it is not limited to partisanship or voting behaviour but rather refers to ideas,
values, and concepts about the way a political community (polity) should be
organised. The ideal of a political community was then approached by various
means. The questionnaire contained questions that directly asked for political values
in a battery (for example, ‘individual freedom’, ‘solidarity’, ‘fairness’, etc.). It also
contained open questions asking for historical examples and ﬁgures the respondents
thought would represent good or bad politics and how the respondents would ideally
imagine good politics. The central theme of all questions remained throughout the
vision of an ‘ideal polity’ that would reﬂect ideas of peace and good politics. In line
with current research on values and identity,67 the assumption here was that re-
sponses to questions about values, ideas, and statements on various matters related
to peacebuilding allow inferences about worldviews.68
This excluded a linear approach as most previous studies on cosmopolitanism
have for instance used. They have investigated cosmopolitan proﬁles along polarised
continuums.69 Here, the questions were rather designed to provide various elements
65 See for discussion also Oppenheim, Questionnaire Design, ch. 8.
66 In the language of Saris and Gallhofer the concept of worldview was treated as a concept-by-postula-
tion; Willem E. Saris and Irmtraud M. Gallhofer, Design, Evaluation, and Analysis of Questionnaires for
Survey Research (Hoboken: Wiley, 2007), pp. 16, seqq.
67 World Values Study Group, World Values Survey, 1981–1984 and 1990–1993 (Ann Arbor: ICPSR,
1994).
68 Erving Goffman, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (New York: Anchor Books, 1959).
69 Florian Pichler, ‘‘‘Down-to-Earth’’ Cosmopolitanism: Subjective and Objective Measurements of
Cosmopolitanism in Survey Research’, Current Sociology, 57:5 (2009), pp. 704–32; Olofsson and
Ohman, ‘Cosmopolitans and Locals’; Mau, Mewes, and Zimmermann, ‘Cosmopolitan Attitudes’.
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that allowed constituting multivariate proﬁles through a factor analysis. Similar
to the assumption of grey zones that underlies the continuum approach, we did
not assume that it was possible to deﬁne clear-cut, distinctive proﬁles but that it
was rather likely that proﬁles would overlap strongly and distinction would exist
in nuances but not in principle. However, the assumption was that such overlaps
are more complex than what can be captured by a uni-dimensional continuum
approach.70 In order to test for extremes, however, several question items contained
answers that were taken from right-wing or left-wing extreme discourses (for example,
advocating the ‘abolishment of private property’).
In order to stay true to the qualitative research character of this small-n study,
the interviews were conducted in person and face-to-face. This allowed discussions
around the question items, clariﬁcations of meanings and the addition of further
information respondents wished to convey. The questionnaire was tested in a pilot
run on ﬁve former members of UNMIK, all English non-native speakers, and pre-
sented at one international conference as well as one university workshop on survey
design. Feedback from all sources was sequentially integrated into the questionnaire
design and led to the reformulation of a large number of questions.
In summary, the research design integrates various methods, which are com-
monly used separately. Mixing methods of data collection serves the purpose of
making it more likely that the results obtained reﬂect the ‘reality out there’. As judg-
ment samples do not allow stochastic validation, validity and reliability of results
have to be obtained by other means. Mixing methods of data collection is one,71 yet
it is not sufﬁcient. The design also included several steps of verifying the conceptual
ﬁt between the questionnaire and the prior theoretical assumptions. Investigator
responsiveness to the sampling population and cross-checking between the principal
investigator at home and the researcher on the ground reduced the likelihood that
the targeting procedure of purposive sampling degenerates into a researcher bias.72
Developing indicators: what did we expect to ﬁnd?
The validity of ﬁndings depends in ﬁrst instance on the accuracy of the indicators
used for classifying and eventually quantifying the information obtained in the ques-
tionnaire-guided interviews. Robert Adcock and David Collier propose a model of
four levels of conceptualisation and measurement:73 on the ﬁrst level the thorough
elaboration of the meaning(s) of the main concept allows the conceptualisation of
systematic deﬁnitions on a second level. These serve in turn to develop indicators
(third level), which allow constructing scores to measure the phenomenon (fourth
level). Following this model, we differentiated the general concept ‘cosmopolitanism’
into four different variants: universalist cosmopolitanism, elite cosmopolitanism,
70 See for a similar approach Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel,Modernization, Cultural Change, and
Democracy: The Human Development Sequence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
71 R. Burke Johnson, ‘Examining the Validity Structure of Qualitative Research’, Education, 118:2 (1997),
p. 288.
72 Morse et al., ‘Veriﬁcation Strategies’, pp. 13–22.
73 Robert Adcock and David Collier, ‘Measurement Validity: A Shared Standard for Qualitative and
Quantitative Research’, American Political Science Review, 95:3 (2001), p. 531.
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glocal cosmopolitanism, and localisable cosmopolitanism. What are the indicators
for either?
All four variants of cosmopolitanism have a common basis, namely a postulate
of openness, tolerance, and solidarity across national, ethnic, or religious divides. Yet,
the social conditions are varying as well as the manifestation of the cosmopolitanism
(see Table 1). In terms of social conditions, elite cosmopolitanism presupposes not
only high education but high education in highly reputed universities and a family
background with relatively high social positions, whereas glocal and localisable
cosmopolitanism postulate, on the contrary, much more variety in the educational
as well as socio-professional background of the cosmopolitans. Universal and elite
cosmopolitanism are also worldviews and attitudes that are postulated to exist
additional to others. We can therefore expect them to be not expressed in hybrid
but in rather pure terms. Practically, this means for instance that people will talk in
‘high’ languages, refer to high culture icons and symbols, be active in high culture
activities (for example, rather theatre visits than football playing), etc. Hybridisation
will, however, be the marker of glocal and localisable cosmopolitanism. Practically,
we expect to ﬁnd that people will use multiple references to local popular culture,
engagement in glocal or localisable activities which do not require high culture
but parochial cultural capital (for example, playing Preferans, a local card game,
rather than theatre visits), etc. Glocal and localisable cosmopolitanism are differ-
ent, however, in two respects. First in the intensity of the parochialism: glocal
cosmopolitanism represents a rather superﬁcial form of hybridisation of the global
and local, whereas localisable cosmopolitanism arises where local familiarity is
deeply rooted (see theoretical discussion above). Second, both are assumed to differ
in their social conditions, too. Glocal cosmopolitanism has been formulated to
develop in urban multicultural and multinational centres, in the so-called world
cities.74 It is in many respects compatible with elite cosmopolitanism as much of the
‘local’ appears in form of highly stylised and scripted forms such as the knowledge
of Gandhi or the practice of Yoga. Localisable cosmopolitanism, on the other hand,
describes the encounter of deeply parochial populations with globalisation which are
likely to be rural and sedentary cultures, and exactly unlikely to become part of ‘high
cultures’.75
For all four types of cosmopolitanism, two types of indicators can be distin-
guished: sociological indicators as well as cultural indicators. The former encom-
passes education and socioeconomic background, whereas the latter refers to cultural
activities and references (see Table 1).
On a fourth level, Adcock and Collier situate the validation of the measurement
scores. This level corresponds to the traditional understanding of validity in which
the concept designates the degree to which the measurement actually measures what
the indicators and concept require them to measure.76
74 Sassen, Cities in a World Economy.
75 Harvey, Cosmopolitanism.
76 For a discussion of the traditional understanding of validity see Paul E. Newton, ‘Clarifying the Con-
sensus Deﬁnition of Validity’, Measurement: Interdisciplinary Research and Perspective, 10:1–2 (2012),
pp. 1–29.
Cosmopolitanism and the culture of peacebuilding 789
Findings of the interviews
The interview sample consisted of 52 civilian staff of UNMIK, as well as 14 inter-
viewees at the UN headquarters in New York. Contrary to our goal we had more
female respondents in our sample than male (57:43 per cent). Yet, the age distribution
corresponded to the prior established proﬁle with the age group 25–45 years repre-
sented in the majority. In total, we interviewed nationals from 25 different countries.
Thinking like a cosmopolitan
The ﬁrst aim of this explorative study was to establish worldview proﬁles of the
respondents. As discussed earlier, worldviews are not clear-cut distinguishable. The
Level 1:
Background
concept
Cosmopolitanism
Level 2:
Systematised
concept
Universal
cosmopolitanism
Elite cosmopoli-
tanism
Glocal
cosmopolitanism
Localisable
cosmopolitanism
Level 3(a):
General
indicators
Evidence of openness, tolerance, solidarity
Level 3(b):
Sociological
indicators
Any
socioeconomic
background
Education in
selected Western
universities (US
and UK mainly);
Upper middle
class, high-
income socio-
economic position
(OECD);
Urban and
globalised
Urban, multi-
cultural socio-
economic
background
Parochial, locally
deeply rooted
socioeconomic
background;
Rather rural than
urban
Level 3(c):
Cultural
indicators
Education
(liberal arts);
Knowledge and
acceptance of
foreign cultures
Use of high
language;
Reference to high
culture symbols
and icons;
High culture prac-
tices (e.g. drama,
opera, literature,
etc.)
Demonstration of
local language
knowledge;
Reference to
multicultural
symbols and icons;
Popular multi-
cultural practices
(e.g. food, sports,
entertainment,
etc.)
Demonstration of
local language
knowledge;
References to
exclusively local
symbols and
icons;
Parochial cultural
practices
Source: Adcock and Collier, ‘Measurement Vailidity’, p. 531.
Table 1. Conceptualisation and measurement of cosmopolitanism following the model by Adcock
and Collier
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fourth level of Adcock and Collier’s model refers to the scores obtained in the
research. Seeking validity of scores means that the researcher needs to make sure
that the measure instruments measure what needs to be measured to validate the
concepts used.77 In this case, the research was explorative as it was charting entirely
new terrain and it was therefore necessary to ﬁrst validate the conceptual chain
as developed above (levels 1 and 2). As we were assuming that the four forms of
cosmopolitanism are variants of the overarching base cosmopolitanism, a common
factor model was used to establish worldview proﬁles. As Brown points out, ‘The
fundamental intent of factor analysis is to determine the number and nature of latent
variables or factors that account for the variation and covariation among a set of
observed measures.’78 As we had not established what kind of pattern we expected
for different worldviews (given that there was no prior research to draw upon), we
speciﬁcally used an exploratory factor analysis to establish those worldview proﬁles.
The factor analysis notably allows exploring if cosmopolitanism is an important
worldview among peacebuilders or not.79 Once this is conﬁrmed, we can proceed in a
second step to the analysis of the kind of cosmopolitanism prevalent.
The question used for the factor analysis was: ‘Which of the following are values
you think should be present and promoted in a political community?’ The respond-
ents were then presented with a list of values and a seven-step scaled answer ranging
from 1 (‘should be very much promoted’) to 7 (‘should not be promoted at all’).
A principal component analysis was then run with all values presented in the list.
Consecutively, values were eliminated from the list as they did not seem to bundle
with any other value in a clear form. In the end, the principal component analysis
established four proﬁles – ‘cosmopolitan’, ‘liberal’, ‘libertarian’, and ‘conservative’ –
with the following values (see Table 2):
Cosmopolitan Liberal Libertarian Conservative
Tolerance
Equality
Solidarity
Merit
Fairness
Competitiveness
Individuality
Family
Loyalty
State sovereignty
Table 2. Proﬁles with values
In a second step, adherence to the proﬁles was tested by creating a dummy variable
agree/not agree for each value that had remained from the list after the principal factor
analysis and to count the adherence to each value individually and to the set of values.
This frequency analysis showed that the cosmopolitan proﬁle, consisting of the values
tolerance, equality and solidarity, is almost consensual as all these three values score
highly among the respondents. It applied in total or large parts to 97 per cent of all
respondents (see Graph 1). Additionally, the values of the liberal proﬁle are equally
quasi-unanimously accepted. The principal factor analysis enhanced the conﬁdence
with which we can assume that the very large majority of respondents assimilated
general cosmopolitan values and it validated hence the construction of the concept
on the ﬁrst level.
77 See Adcock and Collier, ‘Measurement Validity’; Newton, ‘Clarifying the Consensus Deﬁnition’.
78 Timothy A. Brown, Conﬁrmatory Factor Analysis for Applied Research (New York: The Guilford Press,
2006), p. 13; see also Brian S. Everitt and Graham Dunn, Applied Multivariate Data Analysis (London:
Arnold, 2001), p. 271.
79 Adcock and Collier refer to this as nomologial or construct validation; Adcock and Collier ‘Measure-
ment Validity’, p. 542.
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The proﬁling analysis on the basis of the value list allows the conclusion that the
distinctions between the four proﬁles are nuanced and centre on cosmopolitan-liberal
values. Although the libertarian and conservative proﬁles are more polarising, the
question about political values and the resulting principal component factor analysis
already conﬁrm the initial expectation that cosmopolitanism is a dominant world-
view among peacebuilders. We need to ask furthermore what kind of cosmopolitan-
ism is dominant. As we have used the indicator of the evidence of the values of
tolerance, openness, and solidarity to underscore the assumption of cosmopolitanism,
we need to use different indicators (and hence, scores) to assess the speciﬁc form of
cosmopolitanism.80
As proposed in Table 1 above, the distinctions between elite cosmopolitanism,
glocal cosmopolitanism and localisable cosmopolitanism can be teased out by two
types of indicators: those indicators, which relate to the cultural frames of the peace-
builders and those, which evaluate their social status.
In terms of cultural references, the questionnaire asked a number of open ques-
tions which sought to explore respondents’ cultural and historical imagery. The
variance sought after concerned the question whether such references would refer to
a domestic (respondent’s country of origin), local/parochial (in this case Kosovar/
Balkans) or world context.
Three questions were particularly designed to carve out the respondent’s cultural
imagery. The ﬁrst one asked for the respondent’s most admired political personalities,
the two others for historical events. Politics and political thinking is often strongly
associated with particular historical or contemporary ﬁgures. The extreme case is
the labelling of any political foe as ‘Hitler’ or ‘Mussolini’, but also in more moderate
discussions certain names are used to ﬂag up political ideas. Particularly, in conﬂict
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Graph 1. Agreement of respondents with sets of values of four proﬁles
80 See on the risk of circularity Adcock and Collier, ‘Measurement Validity’.
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situations certain persons become shorthand for the party the respondent has chosen.
Name-dropping is furthermore an indicator of a speciﬁc cultural afﬁliation; it is bow
of subordination to the magic of that name and the words and deeds of that person.
When mentioning a speciﬁc name, the speaker expects recognition from the audience
for his knowledge of that exact person.81 Hence, in several ways, naming personalities
invokes adherence to a speciﬁc group and in a wider sense to a speciﬁc worldview.82
Three open questions asked in different ways which political personalities the
respondents admired. The responses to these questions showed, at ﬁrst sight, the
existence of clearly non-Western iconic ﬁgures. A non-Western ﬁgure, namely Mahatma
Gandhi, takes the head in the overall ‘hit list’ of heroes (see Graph 2). Among the
‘top four’, Nelson Mandela is the second non-Western reference; he is also inciden-
tally the second most often mentioned personality. Yet, the majority, over 70 per
cent, of personalities mentioned by the respondents were from Europe or the US
(see Graph 3). Sorted by ‘political colour’, the heroes of the respondents were either
mainstream democratic-liberal or conservative ﬁgures, or ﬁgures from civil society
such as Mandela, Martin Luther King, or other leaders outside the institutionalised
political system. Prominent revolutionary leaders or communists were very rarely
mentioned; fascist ﬁgures not at all. In the category ‘anti-colonial struggle’ the
highest percentage of responses concentrates almost entirely on Mahatma Gandhi.
The non-West existed therefore mainly in the persons of two extremely iconic ﬁgures.
This iconisation consists above all in their reduction to dehistoricised symbols
of non-violent human rights struggle. Gandhi, for example, was selected by Time
81 Robert Klitgaard, ‘Gifts and Bribes’, in Richard J. Zeckhauser (ed.), Strategy and Choice (Cambridge
and London: MIT Press, 1991), pp. 211–40.
82 Nurit Tal-Or, ‘Direct and Indirect Self-Promotion in the Eyes of the Perceivers’, Social Inﬂuence, 5:2
(2010), pp. 87–100; Carmen Lebherz, Klaus Jonas, and Barbara Tomljenovic, ‘Are We Known by the
Company We Keep? Effects of Name-dropping on First Impressions’, Social Inﬂuence, 4:1 (2009),
pp. 62–79.
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Magazine in 1999 as one of the three personalities who had shaped most the twentieth
century. Richard Attenborough drew a ﬂattering portrait of the Indian politician in
his 1989 ﬁlm ‘Gandhi’.
Diffusion processes of ideas are complex processes. In the case of Gandhi, Sean
Chabot and Jan Willem Duyvendak have retraced how this process took place.83
First, the civic rights movements integrated the Gandhian action repertoire. The
success of the civic rights movement then added legitimacy to the interpretation that
the movement had made of Gandhian practices. This interpretation of speciﬁc com-
munities entered mainstream popular culture via media diffusion. Time Magazine’s
selection, hence, marks the endpoint of a long diffusion process of one speciﬁc inter-
pretation of Gandhi’s politics and life. It shows that Gandhian political practices
have been fully integrated into the referential system of Western political com-
munities. Although not a Western personality, Gandhi certainly has become a cult
Western ﬁgure.
The other iconic ﬁgure mentioned, Nelson Mandela, is closely associated with
Gandhi. Gandhi developed some of his ideas on non-violent resistance during
his stay in South Africa (1913–14) and Mandela integrated forty years later the
Gandhian action repertoire into the ANC’s struggle against apartheid. Mandela
received the International Gandhi Peace Prize in 2001 as well as the Gandhi/King
award for non-violence in 1999. Mandela is certainly as much a contemporary icon
of non-violence as Gandhi. As one biographer puts it: ‘He is a universal symbol of
social justice certainly, an exemplary ﬁgure connoting non-racialism and democracy,
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Graph 3. Geographic origin of admired personalities
83 Sean Chabot and Jan Willem Duyvendak, ‘Globalization and Transnational Diffusion Between Social
Movements: Reconceptualizing the Dissemination of the Gandhian Repertoire and the ‘‘Coming Out’’
Routine’, Theory and Society, 31:6 (2002), pp. 697–740; Sean Chabot, Transnational Roots of the Civil
Rights Movement: African American Explorations of the Gandhian Repertoire (Lanham: Lexington
Books, 2012).
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a moral giant.’84 Just as in the case of Gandhi, Mandela’s image in the West has
been widely diffused to popular audiences through media and, among others,
Richard Attenborough’s ﬁlm ‘Cry Freedom’ on South African apartheid.85
Both, Gandhi and Mandela are interesting references in the context of this study
as both are important icons of the United Nations. Every 2 October, on Gandhi’s
birthday, the United Nations celebrate the International Day of Non-Violence and
on every 18 July, the United Nations celebrates Nelson Mandela Day asking people
around the world to sacriﬁce one minute per day for the service to others. The UN
released stamps of both. UN Secretaries General, particularly Koﬁ Annan, frequently
referred to both. Both ﬁgures are strongly scripted as global heroes for humanity. They
therefore represent rather global than glocalised and certainly not localised icons.
The second question aimed at identifying cultural references asked the following
question: ‘Which event constitutes for you the most horrible historical event?’ The
question belongs together with its mirror: ‘Which historical event has left the strongest
impression on you?’ Contrary to the Westernisation of the political personalities, the
answers of the most horrible event that has marked human history as well as the
historical event interviewees could remember the best show per se a distinctly Western
character. The most horrible events were clearly the Shoah and the two World Wars.
Respondents nearly unanimously condemned the collective violence represented by
wars, genocide, and concentration camps (see Graph 4). Particularly the Holocaust
was often mentioned, conﬁrming its status as ‘moral universal’.86 This status, how-
ever, is far from being self-evident. As Alexander points out, it has been carefully
constructed in the post-World War II period, and its acceptance as ethical basis for
a universal law can only be understood on the grounds of this cultural and social
construction process.87
On the other hand, respondents almost as unanimously welcomed the triumph of
liberalism represented by the fall of the Berlin Wall, which was voted by most the
most signiﬁcant historical event of the recent past (see Graph 5). These responses all
indicate the ‘no more war, no more violence’ attitude of the interviewees, yet it does
so with a clear focus on events that have happened in Western countries. The lack of
discussion of colonialism and non-Western history in general is as striking as is the
adherence of non-Western respondents to these narratives. At the same time, there
was no evidence for the existence of the localisable type of cosmopolitanism in our
survey results as there was literally no reference at all to local history, personalities,
or culture. The most probable explanation for this homogeneity in historical and
cultural references is that respondents’ cosmopolitan worldview is deeply rooted in a
84 Elleke Boehmer, Nelson Mandela: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008),
p. 13.
85 Patrick D. Flanery and Andrew Van Der Vlies, ‘Introduction: Annexing the global, globalizing the
local’, Scrutiny2: Issues in English Studies in Southern Africa, 13:1 (2008), pp. 5–19; Rob Nixon,
‘Mandela, Messianism, and the Media’, Transition, 51 (1991), pp. 42–55.
86 Jeffrey C. Alexander, ‘The Social Construction of Moral Universals’, in Jeffrey C. Alexander and
Martin Jay (eds), Remembering the Holocaust: A Debate (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009),
pp. 3–200.
87 Alexander, ‘Social Construction of Moral Universals’; Daniel Levy and Natan Sznaider, ‘Memory
Unbound. The Holocaust and the Formation of Cosmopolitan Memory’, European Journal of Social
Theory, 5:1 (2002), pp. 87–106; Daniel Levy and Natan Sznaider, ‘The Institutionalization of Cosmo-
politan Morality: The Holocaust and Human Rights’, Journal of Human Rights, 3:2 (2004), pp. 143–57.
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Graph 5. Answers to the question ‘Which historical event has left the strongest impression
on you?’
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shared background of formation in (Western) high culture – an argument we develop
further below.
The three questions about ‘heroes’ and historical events do not allow the conclu-
sion of local or even parochial cultural references. Rather, the references given were
strong indicators of Western-led and Western-interpreted globalisation. This points to
the conclusion that, in terms of cultural references, the respondents were rather elite
or glocal cosmopolitans, however, not localised. Yet, in order to further differentiate
between different cosmopolitanism types, it is necessary to also take respondents’
social backgrounds into consideration.
Being a cosmopolitan
The other part of the survey sought to analyse whether civilian peacekeepers in
Kosovo share speciﬁc characteristics with respect to their social and educational
background as well as lifestyles, which could be seen as basic conditions for, and
expressions of, their (type of ) cosmopolitanism. Regarding the social backgrounds
of peacebuilders, our survey shows that, regardless of nationality, international staff
was predominantly from high-income countries and of urban origin. 84 per cent of
respondents originated from high-income countries as categorised by the World
Bank (mostly OECD plus a few non-OECD), and 79 per cent were brought up in
high-income countries. Due to the mainly West-European and Anglo-Saxon origin
of UNMIK, OSCE, and EULEX staff this is little surprising. More striking is the
similarly marked preponderance of urban origins among interviewees: the over-
whelming majority, 88 per cent, come from urban or urban-rural settings, while
only 12 per cent of the respondents grew up in rural areas. A further interesting
observation regarding the geographical background of respondents’ origins and
upbringing was that their families’ mobility during childhood years was relatively
high: the percentage of interviewees who had grown up in other countries than those
of their origin was 21 per cent.
This observation is linked to the family backgrounds of the peacebuilders in
Kosovo. Here again, respondents showed strong similarities. Apart from some single
cases, interviewees came from upper middle-class households with engineering and
the sciences (22.2 per cent), liberal professions (9.5 per cent), or education (9.5 per
cent) as the most frequent paternal employments.88 Only about 15 per cent of the
respondents’ fathers had worked in jobs of low qualiﬁcation like manual labour,
agriculture, or small shop clerks. Science and engineering were by far the most typical
professions of fathers, also explaining the high rate of childhood mobility as these
jobs are often attached to working abroad. Mothers are/were typically teachers
(30.3 per cent) or housewives (25.8 per cent), and only 6 per cent and 1.3 per cent
worked in liberal professions or corporate business management respectively.
Regarding their educational backgrounds, the interviewed UNMIK staff also
showed striking homogeneity. As higher education is one of the access criteria to civil
88 In a ﬁrst step, the categorisation is based on the International Standard Classiﬁcation of Occupations,
used by Eurostat; for the purpose of clarity these were then summarised into larger categories: armed
forces, business management, small business and self-employed, liberal professions, housekeeping,
education, administrative, clerical and technical support staff, professions in the community, science
and engineering, arts, manual labour, agriculture.
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service jobs at the UN, it is not surprising that all respondents had university educa-
tions. Yet, less unsurprisingly, many of them also had a post-graduate education.
Five persons were holders of a BA degree only, while 50 interviewees held an MA
and nine a PhD. Interestingly, almost all post-graduate education had been taken in
high income countries even if the individuals were not born and did not grow up
there. 95 per cent had studied in a high-income country, 5 per cent in an upper or
lower middle-income country, and no one in a low-income country.
The ﬁrst part of the survey also provided data to evaluate cosmopolitan lifestyle,
most importantly the respondents’ mobility and language skills as indicators of
curiosity and tolerance towards foreign cultures and people. The survey showed that
mobility was high among peacebuilders. About one-ﬁfth of the sample was brought
up in one or more countries other than that of their national origin. 67.7 per cent had
studied at least partly in foreign countries, and about 70 per cent had experienced
several stays abroad of more than three months. The reasons for longer expatriation
were usually work or studies; however, tourism was also a major reason mentioned.
The indicators for language skills among staff were also strong. All but the majority
of the English native speakers were at least bilingual, and two thirds of all respond-
ents had studied in a foreign language.
With regard to the three sociological types of cosmopolitanism discussed above,
the ﬁndings allow several interpretations. Respondents’ social backgrounds in high-
income countries, mostly urban settings, and wealthy and highly-educated families
hint at certain basic conditions which conﬁrm the assumptions of elite cosmopolitan-
ism. Yet, especially with regard to the geographical origins of peacebuilders, who
in the case of Kosovo were explicitly recruited from West European countries and
the US, further surveys in other cases of peacebuilding would be necessary to sub-
stantiate this claim. The urban and family backgrounds, however, are strikingly
similar, plausibly conﬁrming both, the glocal and the elite cosmopolitanism proﬁle.
The almost exclusive education in Western universities, furthermore, points towards
elite cosmopolitanism.89 Additionally, another hint at elite cosmopolitanism among
peacebuilders is the high prevalence of post-graduate education. In terms of education,
it is therefore more appropriate to assume elite rather than glocal cosmopolitanism.
The high mobility of respondents, both during childhood (due to fathers’ pro-
fessions) and in connection with their own educational and professional careers,
also reﬂects elite cosmopolitanism as in many cases these expatriations have to be
seen as rather privileged encounters with foreign countries and cultures. This inter-
pretation results from the descriptions given of these expatriations in the interviews
as well as from the fact that most of these were of relatively short duration and in
almost all cases due to ‘missions’, not migration which would call for integration
into local societies.
Glocal cosmopolitanism has been described as arising from the whole range of
possible professional encounters, not only on the expatriate high-professional level,
and mainly through migration, and within a shared local anchoring, that is, the big
city. Indeed, Beck theoretically rejects elite cosmopolitanism and Robert Holton and
89 In a recently commenced analysis of more than 200 CVs of civilian staff in UN and OSCE missions,
posted on the professional networking webpage www.linkedin.com, this ﬁnding seems conﬁrmed; an
above average number of persons represented in this study have gained their post-graduate degree in
an Ivy league institution or high-proﬁle institution in other countries (London School of Economics).
However, these ﬁndings are for the moment provisional and require further conﬁrmation.
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Timothy Phillips describe glocal cosmopolitanism across all professional levels.90
Our ﬁndings suggest that there is a strong connection between the professional im-
peratives of globalisation that have shaped peacebuilders’ careers and the cosmo-
politan culture they represent, yet that their mobility seems to have rather prevented
deep encounters with the local than having encouraged them. None of the ﬁndings
hint at local anchors and hence, neither glocal nor localisable cosmopolitanism seems
to be the likely description of the peacebuilders’ cosmopolitanism.
Validity and reliability of ﬁndings
Given the small sample studies here, the question arises how valid and reliable these
ﬁndings are and if they can be generalised. In terms of validity, two aspects need to
be distinguished. First, validity refers to the consistency of the conceptual develop-
ment with the ‘measurement’, that is, the question whether the general concept,
the speciﬁed concepts, and the indicators are consistent. Second, validity refers to
the ‘measurement instrument’ per se, whether the questionnaire allowed obtaining
answers that can support our argument or not. Although commonly distinguished
in analytical terms, these two aspects practically come together in the question
whether ‘the relationship between the account and . . . the phenomena that the account
is about’ is sound.91
As far as the validity of the conceptual framework is concerned, our explorative
factor analysis showed, in a ﬁrst step, the existence of a distinct cosmopolitan proﬁle
among the respondents. In a second step, more speciﬁc questions on cultural references
allowed to specify this proﬁle. Our indicators allowed excluding one option –
localisable cosmopolitanism – and allowed accumulating evidence that made elite
cosmopolitanism the more likely form to be found than glocal cosmopolitanism.
The questions about the socioeconomic background of the respondents, particularly
the questions about education and travelling, amassed evidence that the peace-
builders’ cosmopolitanism was of the elite kind. Both indicators together, hence,
allowed assessing the speciﬁed concepts of cosmopolitanism. Yet, the current ﬁndings
also show that a more precise distinguishing line needs to be drawn between glocal
and elite cosmopolitanism in terms of the cross-cultural encounters that will provide
local anchoring and such that will not.
As far as the accuracy is concerned with which our ﬁndings reﬂect reality, there is
no stochastic way of assessing their validity. However, one can argue that the careful
research and questionnaire design, as well as the continuous control process of the
interviewing and sampling procedure, all contributed to exclude possible bias. Argu-
ing with Johnson, we can therefore assume that all precautions have been taken to
avoid research bias and that, hence, the study has reached a high level of descriptive
and interpretative validity.92
Accordingly, one can assume that the ﬁndings of this study would apply to a
structurally similar sample at a different point in time and populated by different
90 Beck, The Cosmopolitan Vision; Robert Holton and Timothy Phillips, ‘Popular Attitudes to Globalisa-
tion’, Policy, Organisation and Society, 20:2 (2001), pp. 5–21.
91 Joseph A. Maxwell, ‘Understanding and Validity in Qualitative Research’, Harvard Educational Review,
62:3 (1992), p. 283.
92 Johnson, ‘Examining the Validity Structure’, p. 283
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respondents. Certainly, these results are not representative in the statistical sense of
the term but ‘we can generalize to other people, settings, and times to the degree
that they are similar to the people, settings, and times in the original study’.93 Future
studies in other cases of UN peacebuilding missions will thus need to discuss in how
far the basic characteristics of the sample are comparable to the ones of the Kosovo
case, or in how far potential differences in ﬁndings can be explained by differences in
these characteristics respectively. There is strong evidence that other peacebuilding
missions are structurally very similar to the Kosovo one even if they are taking place
in different countries and at different times. Past research on peacebuilding has, in
fact, pointed out that much of the structural similarities of peacebuilding missions is
due to the headquarter constraints, and that peacebuilding missions are more charac-
terised by organisational features than by local and particular features.94
This means that the ﬁndings do not allow yet the formulation of axiomatic causal
mechanisms. Rather it is necessary to reiterate this study with other groups before
more ﬁrm inferences can be drawn. Yet, it allows drawing conclusions for this
sample and carefully extrapolating these ﬁndings to structurally similar groups. This
is all the more the case as the study found a very high level of homogeneity in the
answers. In this sample, the ﬁndings are very little scattered and it is therefore likely
that a bigger sample would not have found larger deviations either.
Conclusion
In summary, the results of our survey exploring the nature of cosmopolitan culture
among civilian peacebuilders allow for a couple of carefully concluding inter-
pretations. On the one hand, the vast majority of respondents showed general
characteristics of universalist-liberal cosmopolitans regarding their values and world-
views, which were highly uniform and also conﬁrmed the assumption of universalist
cosmopolitanism’s liberal pedigree, as claimed by Brown and Held. At the same
time, the study clearly showed the analytical limits of the liberal-universalist theory
of cosmopolitanism, which tells us nothing about the enabling social conditions of
cosmopolitanism. Making use of three strands of sociological-empirical critique on
this concept, namely the concepts of glocal, elite, and localisable cosmopolitanism,
we were able to show nuances in the type of cosmopolitanism displayed by civilian
peacebuilders in Kosovo, which the liberal-universalist concept cannot account for.
There was some evidence that peacebuilders’ cosmopolitanism was connected
to their education and to professional globalisation imperatives, as claimed by pro-
ponents of glocal cosmopolitanism. In this reading, peacebuilders’ cosmopolitanism
would be an effect of their internationalised study and working environments and
their high mobility in both professional and recreational terms. Most ﬁndings, how-
ever, hinted at a higher degree of social particularity or exclusivity of peacebuilders’
cosmopolitanism, pointing in the direction of Calhoun’s observation that universal-
liberal cosmopolitanism is conditioned by the particular culture of a Western elite.
93 Ibid., p. 290.
94 Julian Junk, ‘Function Follows Form: The Organisation and Design of Peace Operations’, Journal
of Intervention and Statebuilding, 6:3 (2012), pp. 299–324; Michael Lipson, ‘Performance Under Ambi-
guity: International Organization Performance in UN Peacekeeping’, The Review of International
Organizations, 5:3 (2010), pp. 249–84; Sending, ‘Why Peacebuilders Fail’.
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Thus while it is possible that some expressions of cosmopolitanism we found among
our interviewees resulted from their international working environment (for instance,
the frequent reference to Gandhi and Mandela, who are central ﬁgures in UN
culture), we did neither ﬁnd the social variety nor the mix-and-match assemblages
including local cultural elements typical for glocal cosmopolitanism. Rather evidence
for a much more exclusive rooting of peacebuilders’ cosmopolitan disposition
abounded and became most visible in the scarce variation we found with regard
to social backgrounds and the lack of reference of local (in this case, Kosovar or
Balkans) culture. The dominant form of cosmopolitanism found among UN peace-
builders in Kosovo in this study can thus be subsumed under the elite type.
With respect to the type of localisable cosmopolitanism, which in our theoretical
discussion emerged as most appropriate form of cosmopolitanism in the sense of
a basis of external actors’ context-sensitive and inclusive assistance in local peace
processes, the ﬁndings were disillusioning. There were few hints that civilian peace-
builders in Kosovo represented this type of cosmopolitan culture or that there were
emerging links between international peacebuilders and local actors and culture
in this sense. Only very few respondents showed signs of a space-conscious cosmo-
politanism in Harvey’s sense. Rather, they tended to be neither rooted in their home
culture nor speciﬁcally aware of the host country’s culture, but rather displaying a
global culture evolving around Western(ised) symbols and values.
If the emancipatory or post-liberal concepts of peacebuilding discussed above are
right, the only way out of the ‘cosmopolitan peace dilemma’ is a peacebuilding prac-
tice that is rooted in and tolerant of local knowledge and society; yet such a practice
cannot be expected on the basis of our ﬁndings about current peacebuilding staff. It
is the task of further research to explore ways that the local can be more ﬁrmly
rooted in peacebuilding.
The next necessary research step is to repeat our study with other (possibly bigger)
samples of UN peacebuilders, both to test our general ﬁndings about UN peace-
builders’ cosmopolitanism and also to ﬁnd out in how far our ﬁndings represent the
speciﬁcs of one particular case of intervention, namely the UN Mission in Kosovo.
Another way of broadening the research would be to include the staff of other than
UN peacebuilding agencies in order to account for different organisational cultures
and to study whether this has an effect on cosmopolitan dispositions. Given the
exploratory nature of this research, which is due to the fact that it is the ﬁrst study of
this nature, future research projects are invited to use and reﬁne our methodological
approach, which we see as a qualitative study. The vocabulary of quantitative studies
(validity, reliability, errors, representativity, indicators, variables, etc.) that we use as
descriptive tools has a distinctively different meaning in our study. Most importantly,
validity is not seen in terms of standard error testing but as internal validity of the
research design and external validity as expression of the conﬁdence with which we
assume that the ﬁndings of this exploratory study can be used for further explora-
tions of the sociology of peacebuilding or international organisations. Based on our
discussion, we do not expect fundamentally adverse ﬁndings from such studies, but
rather subtle differences deriving from speciﬁcs of each case.
Our ﬁndings also hint at the necessity to rethink UN peacebuilding practice.
Although it is not completely ruled out that current peacebuilders develop a form of
localisable cosmopolitan disposition by ‘going native’, our ﬁndings rather indicate
that in order to enable locally owned forms of peacebuilding it might be necessary
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for international agencies to thoroughly reﬂect on and fundamentally change their
internal organisational recruitment, career, and reward procedures in order to
encourage localisation.
International agencies, particularly the UN, have up to now resisted such calls,
commonly insisting on the ideal of the ‘international civil servant’. Yet, this ideal
which dates back to the days of the second Secretary General, Dag Hammarskjo¨ld,95
was certainly an appropriate model to guarantee neutrality in times of Cold War
peacekeeping but it might not be suitable for present day peacebuilding within con-
ﬂict-torn societies. Indeed, it is the habitual concept of neutrality that is at stake and
which requires rethinking.96 From the perspective of localisable cosmopolitanism,
real neutrality can only be achieved in combining deep local knowledge with cosmo-
politan openness, tolerance, and universal solidarity. But this requires, ﬁrst of all,
deep engagement of the global with the local.
There are various ways international agencies could explore localising staff:
Recruiting local staff, giving preference to locally knowledgeable candidates over
those trained in prestigious but Western institutions, encouraging institutionally the
immersion of staff in local contexts through longer contracts, etc. Any such measures,
however, would have to go hand-in-hand with reforms of organisational training,
accountability and culture in order to assure that ‘going native’ does not have the
undesirable effect of becoming partisan to one side of the conﬂict. Yet, no matter
which strategy was chosen, the potential tension between the traditional understand-
ing of the organisation’s neutrality and the need for localisation is, by any account,
the greatest challenge to overcome if localisable cosmopolitanism ought to be the
basis for peacebuilding.
Future research should thus concentrate even more on local initiatives of peace-
building, trying to single out what made them ‘successful’ in the eyes of local conﬂict
parties and, as a part of this, how localisable cosmopolitanism developed in these
cases. It should also explore in how far the ﬁndings could be transferred, if at all, to
other places and how external actors could assist, if at all, in initiating or supporting
such local processes. This presupposes a huge step away from the liberal deﬁnition
of peace, which is still the basis of much research on peacebuilding, and towards
a locally derived deﬁnition of ‘peace’ or ‘success’, which renders a conﬂict solution
locally legitimate.
95 Simon Chesterman, ‘Introduction: Secretary or General?’, in Simon Chesterman (ed.), Secretary or
General? The UN Secretary in World Affairs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Kent J.
Kille, The UN Secretary-General and Moral Authority: Ethics and Religion in International Leadership
(Washington: Georgetown University Press, 2007).
96 Anne Orford, International Authority and the Responsibility to Protect (Cambridge and New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2011).
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